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THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM CoPYRIGHT

Ac1
BY TYLF.R H1LTON

1

l.

l NTRODUCTJON

n the late 1990s, entertainment industry groups like the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recorrung
Industry Association of America (RIAA) faced a major threat
to their business model: digital media. Although the ability to
make copies of analog media, such as by dubbing a cassette tape
or recording a televjsion broadcast, had been around for many
years, digital merna offered the ability to make perfect copies.
While the quality of analog copies declines with each generation,
digital media alJow for infinite wpies with no reduction in quality. 2
The advent of new ways ro copy and use digital media, paired
with the instant dispersion capabilities of the lmernet, brought
justified fears that piracy of copyrighted content would increase. 3
As part of its crusade to protect digital content, the
entertainment industry resorted to Digital Rights Management (DRI\1),
the term for a technological system that restricts access tO digital
media. For example, a digital sound file downloaded from Apple's
popular iTunes store has restrictions that prevent a comumer from
playing it on an MP3 player produced by another manufacturer, and
a DVD movie has digital protection that prevent users from copying
the movie onto a computer's hard drive. The entertainment industry
sought, and obtained, legal protection against the circumvention
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of DRM systems in the form of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, or DMCA, which President Clinton signed into law in 1998:~.
Section 1201 of the DMCA made it illegal to circumvent or
distribute tools for the purpose of circumventing DIUv1 systems.5
\'\'hile the goal of the DMCA was to stop piracy on the 1nternet
and elsewhere, it has not proven effective in doing so. Section 1201 has
introduced many unimended consequences that have injured legitimate
consumers and competitors, who now find legally backed restrictions
to otherwise lawful uses of digital content. Congressman Rick Boucher
has introduced an amendment to the DMCA, called the Digital1\Ieclia
Consumers' Rights Act (DJ\fCRA), that remedies rnany of the DMCA's
unintended conseqllences. Congress should pass this amendment
because the DMCA currently puts copyright legislation into the hands
of copyright holders, criminalizes legitimate fair use of digital mectia
by the public, and stifles market competition, all the while failing in its
goal to prevent Internet piracy and protect creators of original works.

II.

P L \CING LEGISLATION IN THE H ANUS OF CoPYRJGI:JT H o LDERS

\X'hen Congress passed the DMCA, it effectiYely transferred
many areas of copyrightlegislation into the hands of copyright holders. 6
Though giving \i.rtuallawmaking power to g roups who are the primary
beneficiaries of the mles they create is very dangerous, the DMCA
does just that. In a sense, DAAl systems are comparable to fences.
While property owners may use fences to protect their property, it
would be unwise to pass a law banning the crossing of fences, because
sometimes there is a legitimate reason for doing so, such as to retrieve
a piece of personal property. In addition, a law that prohibits the
4
See ge1uroi!J U.S. CcwYRlGHT 0FFTCI3, SUl\l?IL\RY: THI:i DlGITc\L l\1u.LENNIU~l
C1 li'YRlGIIT AcT 01· 1998 (1998), http:/ / www.copyri.ght.gov / legislation/ dmca.pdf
(discussing background and purposes of the DMCA).

5

6
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DJ\.1C1\ 9 (2006), http:/ /www.eff.org/lP/DMCr\/DMCA_
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crossing of fences is unnecessary to protect private property, because
private property is already protected w1der trespassing and other laws.7
Similarly, DRM srstems act as fences against efforts to gain access
to copyrighted material. I n many cases, the end result of actions to
circumvent DRl\ti systems falls under the doctrine of "fair use," which
allows exemptions to copyright law "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching .. . scholarship, or research."<~
Pair use is an intentionally vague and evolving area of copyright law
that leaves many questions up to the courts.9 When ruling on fair use
issues, courts consider the purpose of the use of the work (such as
whether it is commercial o r noncommercial), the nature of the work,
the amount of the work being used, and the effect of that use on the
work's market value. w Many of these questions remain undecided,
but Section 1201 prevents the courts from ruling on the issue at all
by making the initial circumvention illegal. In other words, since
the DMCA makes it illegal to cross the fence in the first place, it is
impossible to determine the legality of the purpose behind the crossing.
Because the D MCA criminalizes the initial circumvention of
D RM systems, the law gives copyright holders the chance to decide
what constitutes fair use of their content, and copyright holders
have routinely ru led in their own favo r by restricting uses that would
otherwise be legal. The opinion of copyright holders and the opinions
of the courts, however, do not always coincide. For example, in the
1984 Supreme Court case Sot!)' Corp. z: U11iversa/ Cit;• St11dios, Inc., 11
copyright holders fought to ban the newly invented VCR because
7
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of its capability to record copyrighted tele\1sion broadcasts for later
viewing. NeYertheless, the Court found these acts of "rime-shifting"
to be a fair use by consumers. More recently, the music industry inhially
argued in Metro-Gold~ryn-Mq_>•er Studios lttc. t~ Groksterl 2 that copying a
CD's tracks onto a computer and then tmnsferring those tracks to
Apple's iPod in 1\fP3 format \t;•as "perfectly legal." 13 Later io a brief
to the U.S. Coprrigbt Office, industry groups contradicted themselves
by proclaiming the action not to be a fair use. 1+ D espite copyright
holders' inconsistency and self-interest, Section 1201 allows them to
set their own rules by writing DRM restrictions on whatever they do
not deem co be a fair use of their content, and then have full legal
backing against efforts to bypass those restrictions. Because there are
no limits as to which types of DRM systems are permitted (only that
the system ''effectively controls access to a work" 15), copyright holders
have the potential to effectively rewrite copyright law as it pertains to
their content because the conditions they set are backed by the DMCA.
The DMCA gives copyright holders this power despite tbe
fact that DRi\1 systems can potentially harm consumers, as the recent
Sony Bl\IG Music Entertainment "rootkit" settlement demonstrates.
In the case, consumers filed complaints against Sony BMG because
of certain D R.r\1. software Sony HMG had 1mplanted in its CDs. 16 The
complillms alleged that the software limited the number of copies of
the CDs that could be made and also forced consumers to use Sony
or J\licrosoft software to play rhe CDs on a personal computer. The
12
125 S. Cr. 2764 (2005).
13
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, l\IG~I , .. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005), available at http:/ /wW\\:Supremecourt:us.gm'/oral_argurnems/ :lrb"llment_
transcriptS/04-480.pcl£
14
Joim Replr Comments of Association of ,\mcricnn Publishers et al., In
re E....emption to Prohibition on Circum,·ention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, No. RM 2005-11, a1 22-23 (U.S. Copyright Office
Feb. 2, 2006), available at http:/ /www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11mctalitz_
AAP.pdf.
15
17 U.S.C.S. § 1201 (a)(3) (2003).
16
In 1'1' Sony BMG CD Technologies Litigauon, No. 05-CV-09575-NRB
(S.D.~. Y. 2005).
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DRM software also prohibited users from transferring songs to Apple's
iPoJ portable music player. ,- Each of these actions are considered fair
uses. Even worse, however, were the risks that this software posed to
consumers by the CO\'ert way in which it operated. Upon inserting the
CD into the computer, an End l T ~cr License Agreement confronted
the user. The complaint~ alleged th:n this agreement tlid not disclose
the limits placed on the audio files.' ri The software then proceeded
to install a "rootkit", a soft\,·are tool used to hide programs, inside
the system. 19 This rootkit was also capable of hiding other programs,
meaning that it could also cloak v iruses and other malicious soft\vare.
Morco,·er, the rootkit essentially disabled security measures like
firewalls and anti-spyware programs, exposing the computer to attack.~'
Thomas Hesse, president of Sony BMG's Glo bal Digital Business,
ga,·e one example of his industry's attitude towards consumers when
he said, "M ost people, I think, don't even know what a rootkit is, so
why should they care about it?"21 lt was impossible to uninstall the
rootkit until Sony, in response to complaints, later created software
for that purpose.2.' EYentuaUy, the case was settled and Sony B~IG
compensated consumers for the crippled CD s.2J The complaints
against Sony BMG illustrate why it is unwise to allow companies to
haYe legally backed free reign ro impose DR.t\1 systems on consumers.

17
ln 1'r Sony BMG CD Technolo~es Litigation, No. 05-CV-09575- Rl3
(S.D.N.Y 2005), at 5.
18
ld. at 6.
19
Jd. at 7.
20
!d. at 7-8.
21
Sony Music CDs Under Fire from Prh-:tc\' Ad,·oc:ucs (NPR radio
broadcast, ).forrung f:.dttion, No,·. 4, 2005), :t\-ailable at http:/ h ..-wv.·.npr.org/
templates/ story/ story.php?story 1d - 4989260.
22
In ''r, uny B~lG CD Technologies Litigation at 8, No. 05-CV-09575
(NRB) (S.D.~.\ . 2005).
23
So:>~\ / B~IG, SntM \RY l"1rrtCT (2006), http:// www.
!l<>nybmgcdtech~ettlemt'nL.com/pdfs/SummaryNotice.pdf.
'i
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III.

CRThHNALIZATION OF FAIR

UsE

Section 1201 of the DMCA also criminalizes legitimate fair use
rights of consumers. Violators of Section 1201 can face up to $500,000
in fines and five years in prison for the first offense.24 The S01!J case
showed that despite the protests of copyright holders, noncommercial
"time-shifting" of copyrighted television programs constitutes a fair
use. There are other examples of efforts by copyright holders to
restrict fair use rights. Today, the personal computer is probably the
most frequently used tool for making digital copies. The Audio Home
RecordingAct (AHRA) of 1992 prohibits copyright holders from suing
consumers who use digital audio recording deYices to make digital
copies for noncommercial use/5 in exchange for royalty payments on
recording materials 26 and the requirement that companies implement
copying controls on recording devices. 27 The personal computer
is not considered to be a "digital audio recording device" and thus
does not receive immunity under the act, but there are indications its
use also falls under fair use. In R1AA 11. Diamond .Nltdtimedia 5_ystems,
lnc. 28 , the RIAA sued Diamond, an electronics company, in order to
halt Diamond's production and sale of the Rio, one of the first of
today's popular portable 11P3 players. The RIAA alleged that the
Rio was not subject to the AHRA and did not employ the copying
controls.29 The court determined that while tl1e Rio was not considered
a "digital audio recording device" under the Act, the procedure of
"space-shifting", in which an audio file is transferred from a CD to a
computer as a very large audio file and then compressed into a much
smaller MP3 fi le, was a "paradigmatic noncommercial personal use
entirely consistent with ilie purposes of the Act." 30 ln doing so, the
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

17 u.s.c. § 1204 (2003).
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2003).
17 u.s. c. § 1003 (2003).
17 u.s. c. § 1002 (2003).
180 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
Jd. at 1075.
ld. at 1079.
6
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courts quoted a Senate report from the time of the AHRA showing
that the purpose of the act was to "ensure d1e right of consumers
to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for
their private, noncommercial use." 31 The Dl\ICA currently restricts
many of ilie rights Congress established in passing the Af IRA.
Consumers have more rights than copyright holders will concede
iliern, and the Di\ICA unfairly criminalizes the exercise of those rights.
One finds examples of how copyright holders have criminalized
frur use in lhe current market for music downloads. Today, every legal
music download service in cl1e United States offering a large amount
of content from major record labels embeds DRM systems into ilieir
auclio files. This prevents a file purchased at Apple's iTunes store from
being played on an 1fP3 player manufactured by any other company,
and also prohibits a file purchased from Napster or the \XIalmart Music
Store from playing on Apple's iPod. Although it would seem that based
on Diamond and the AHRA converting a legitimately purchased music
file from one format to another would constitute a fair use, Section
1201 prohibits circumventing the DRM systems embedded in the files
in order to transfer formats. Tbjs means that if a person who purchases
cl1eir digital music collection from Apple ever wants to switch from
ilie iPod to a different brand of MP3 player or vice versa, he o r she
has to repurchase their entire collection in order to avoid prosecution.
One sees another example of using Section 1201 to crimlnalize
potential fair uses in 321 St11dios v. Afetro GoldJJ!)Il Mr!Jer Studios, Inc. 32
321 Studios created the programs DVD X-COPY and DVD Copy
Plus, both of ~which allow users to decrypt the Contents Scrambler
System (CSS), a DRl'\I system embedded in DVD moYie releases to
prevent copying of ilie content. D ecrypting ilie CSS permitted users
to create an archkal backup copy of DVDs they had purchased.33
i\IGM sued 321 Studios, alleging iliat 321 's software violated ilie terms
of Section 1201 due to its capability to circumvent the CSS system.
The defendants argued that making an archival backup copy of a DVD
31
32
33

S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 86 (1992).
307 F.Supp.2d I 085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
ltl. at I091.
7
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is an expressly autho rized fair use under copyright laws, 34 and the court
agreed. HoweYer, the court also stared that" ... rhe downstream uses
of the software hy the customers of 321, whether legal or illegal, are
not relevant to determining whether 321 itself is violating the sratutc."35
Thus, 321 Studios lost the case because their software "picked the
lock" on the DR.i\l to make that copying possible. Jn other v.·ords,
because 321 's software allowed consumers to cross a fence, the court
could not consider consumers' reason for doing so when determining
the software's legality. Tbc court also argued that fair use rights are not
limjted under the DJ\lCA because the act only prohibits the trafficking
of circum,~ention de' iet:s, not the act of circum,·ention itself Trus is
largely irrelevant to consumers, howe,er, since most consumers Lack the
technical knowledge required to circumvent DRM systems and must
therefore rely on tools produced by others. Section 1201 can thus be used
to criminalize the avct·age consumer's fair usc of copyrighted materials.

IV LIMIT!

c., 1L-\RKET Co\JPETJTJO~

Section 1201 also stifles legitimate competition in the
markerplace. 36 Because it is illegal to circum\'cnt access controls on
digital media, competitors are potentially prohibited from offering
alternative digital media players that rely on circumvention to
function. One example is RealNetworks' attempt to use its Harmony
software to permit files purchased from its online store to play on
Apple's iPod. Apple has threatened legal action under the DMCA
against ReaiNetworks for these efforts.'" ReaiNetworks' stated in
its Securities and Exchange Commission report: ''Although we
bdieye our Harmony technology is legal, Lhcrc is no assurance that
34
35
36

SHpm note 32, :u I1197.
/d.
Tl~luTm B. 1.1:.1, C.\TO

IMTJTUTE, CIRct lMYI·NTIM.. CollfPE'JTllON: Tu~:.

ACT I (2006),
htlp:/ /www.cato.org/pubs/pal'/pa564.pdf.
37
Matt I lines, 'Stunned' Apple Rails against Real's iPod
Move, C~LT NI:.\XS.C()~l,Jul. 29, 2004, http:/ / ne,,.·s.cum.cum/
'Srunncd'+ Applc+rails+ag:unst- Rt.-al's...-iPod+mon:/2 111{1-I04 1_3-5288378.htmL
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a court would agree w1th our position.""' Rather than imprO\;ng
on their produces to compete in the market, the DJ\1CA encourages
companies to usc legal threats to stifle their competition. These
threats entail the potential for high litigation costs and severe
penalties that discourage innoYation on the part of other companies.
Another example of how thL Di\ICA can stiflt! competition is
the case of 11."\'llltlrk 1~ \"lt~ticColllmlCo111pounJis."' Lexmark sold "prebate"
primer cartridges protected by special software as part of an agrecmem
jn which the customer agreed ro return used cartridges to Lexmark to
be refilled. Static Control Components circumYcnted the software's
authentication process in order to allow competitors to refill the
cartridges, causing Lexmark to sue Static Control Components under
Section 1201.'"1 Static Control Components won the case, but the legal
battle forced the company to keep its product off the market for 19
months.4'
The real loser in these battles is the consumer, who loses
the benefits of market competition when making choices to purchase
copyrighted marcrial-;. These benefits include lower costs and newer
ways to use digital content. Wblle copyright laws Iike the D l\ICA should
prevent piracy, they should not do so at the expense of legitimate
market compericion.

v. O PPOSI~G VIE\\"S
Prevention of piracy is one of the main arguments copyright
holders use in favor of Section 1201.42 Copyright holders fear
that without legal backing, their DRM systems can serYe no useful
38
Reah,ctworks Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at32 (\lay 6, 2005),
a"'ilable at http:// clocs.real.com/docs/im·estors/ Y08--8.pdf.
39
387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
40
ld.
41
Eu:c-rn.O"JI( foRE'F.Oml rrmNTIF.R, UNrNTF.NOr.D CoNSFQIIF.NrES: SE.\"F.N
Yr \RS l':-'DFR THL D~ICA 9 (2006), http:/ /www.eff.org/lPI 01\[C;\/Di\ICA_
unintended_Y4.pdf.
RIAt\ Coprright Laws, http:/ /www.riaa.com/issucs'Vo5Ccopy.right'Vo5Cb
42
ws.asp#millen last \lsncd Dec. 9, 2006).
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purpose in stOpping pirates. As Jack Valenti, bead of the MPAA
said about amending the DMCA, " lt legalizes haclcing. lt allows
you to make a copy or many copies. And the 1OOOth copr of a
DVD . .. is as pure and pristine as the originaL You strip away aU
d1e protective clothing of that DVD and leave it naked and alone."n
Yet, this "protecti,•e clothing" does not stOp piracy.44 With
copy protection schemes, the t}uestion is not if they will be broken,
but: when. 45 Indeed, peer-to-peer file sharing networks still teem
with copyrighted content. DRM systems originally protected much
of this content, but computer users cracked these systems shortly
after the content's release. Additionally, because of the Internet,
once one copy has been unlocked, infinite copies can be made and
distributed globally. The circumvention of the DRl\1 may have taken
place in a country without DMCA-like laws, which when paired with
the degree of anonymity tl1e Internet offers makes prosecution of
actual pirates under the DMCA extremely difficult. The Napster
phenomenon, which initiated ·widespread file-sharing of music and
other media through peer-co-peer networks on the Internet, occurred
after Congress passed the DMCA. A&M Records sued Napster4 ~
and won, but not because of the DMCA. In fact, Napster used a
different section of the DMCA (not Section 1201), one that g rants
immunity to Internet sen·ice providers for copyright infringement
by their clients under certain conditio ns;*' as a defense against
allegations o f contributory copyright infringement.48 That the DMCA
43
D eclan ~lcCullagh, Congress Mulls ReYisions to D~I CA, CNE:c1 NE\\S.
May 12,2004, http:/ /news.com.com/Congress+mulls+redsions+w+DMCA
/2100- 1025_3-521 1674.html?rag=nl.
44
TL~IOTHY 13. LE£, CATo INSTITUTE, CtRCOM \ 'ENTJNG CoMPETJTION:TI U:::
P HR\'ERSE Cot-:SEQL E-\1CES oF THE DIGITAl. M .I.LLI:.NNil'•'' CoP\ RJGHT tkT 20 (2006),
http:/ /w\\'\\:cato.org/pubs/pas/pa564.pdf.
45
BRLII 1=. SCH'-Elll, THI:. N.m.. R.-\1.. L.\\\:. <If OIGJT.-u. CoNn-"r 8 (2001),
hrtp:/(\V\\'\"ima.umn.edu/ talks/w<Jrkshops/2-12-16.2001/ schneicr/Digita!Rights.
pdf.
46
A&M Records, Inc. ''· Napster, lac., 239 E3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
47
17 L'.S.C.S. § 512 (2(Hl3).
48
A&~l Records, Inc.''· • apster, lnc., 239 E3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
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gave Napster cover for enabling copyright infringement is highly
ironic considering the DMCA's intended purpose to prevent piracy.
A second argument against amending Section 1201 is that
Section 1201 protects artists who create original works. 4CJ In this
sense, Valenti called the DMCA "a viable and critical law that
protects copyright holders from unauthorized abuse of their works
in the digital arena."51' However, at least with music, many artists
object to the record companies' use of DRM restrictions on their
works, which often occurs against their ·will. In Canada, popular
recording artists and groups such as Barenaked Ladies, Avril Lavinge,
and Sum 41 have formed the Canadian Music Creators Coalition
(C:l\ICC), one of whose goals is to preYent Canada's government
from passing legislation like the D:t-.I CA. In an open letter, the
coalition expressed its alarm at record companies' usage of CMCC
members' names to further the companies' own interests, and said
this about technological restrictions on the coa]jtion members' music:
Artists do not support using digital locks to
increase the labels' control over the distribution,
use and enjoyment of music or laws that prohibit
circumvention of such technological measures. T he
government should not blindly implement decadeold treaties designed to give control to major labels
and take choices away from artists and consumers.
Laws should protect artists and consumers, not
restrictive technologies. Consumers should be able

49
~lPAA's Valenti Applauds 1 ew York Second Circuit Coun of Appeals
Decision to Uphold Lower Court D ecision in "Motion Picture Industry DeCSS
Case, http:/ /www.mpaa.org/2002_05_1 7a.asp (last \"isited Dec. 8, 2006). See also
I lilary Rosen Testimony at DCi\'IA I learin~, http:/ /www.riaa.com/news%5Cnewsl
etter'Vo5Cpressl999%5C102899_2.asp Qast visited D ec. 8, 2006).
50
.:\lPAA's Valenti Applauds New York Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Decision to Uphold Lower Court Decision in :'\fotion Picture Industry DeCSS
Case, http:/ /w\vw.mpaa.org/2002_ 05_ 17a.asp Qast \"isited Dec. 8, 2006).
II
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to transfer the music they buy to other formats under
a right of fair use, wid10ut having to pay twice. 51
Often, it appears, the middlemen (the record companies
in this case), not the producers or consumers, reap the most
benefit from Dfuvi restrictions because they can hold both
sides hostage, especially when backed by leg]slation such as the
DMCA. This hinders the distribution of artists' material because
content crippled by DR.l\I systems is less attractive to consumers.
Although restrictive copyright laws like the DMCA may benefit
creators of original works in the short term, the law's overall effect is
negative. Digital copyright restrictions have the potential to prevent
worksfromeverreachiogthepublicdomain.52 Creativeworksarenotborn
from nothing, but draw from the work of previous creators. 53 A limited
public domain ultimately limits the pool from which creators of works
can draw and thus hinders their ability to build upon the works of others.

VI. PROPOSED A.\m

Di\IE:-.:T TO S ECTION

1201

To address the DMCA's problems, in 2005 Congressman
Rick Boucher introduced the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act
(DMCRA). The DMCRA, among other things, amends Section 1201
by adding the following: "[A)nd it is not a violation of dus section
to circumvent a technological measure in order to obtain access to
the work for purposes of making noninfringing use of the work." 54
This amendment restores fair use rights to legitimate consumers
and competitors while still allowing for penalties against those who
51
Letter from Ste,·en Page, et al., Canadian Music Creators Coalition, to
Maxime Bernier, i\fi ruster of Industry and Bev Oda, :Minister of Canadian Heritage
(2006) anilable ar http:/ /www.musiccreators.ca/docs/Open_Letter_to_Ministers.
pdf.
52
\X'illiam
Fisher m, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.K~'<T L. Rt-.\'. 1203, 1233 (1998).
53
RobertS. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.i: Tl~fFS ~L\G., Jan. 25,
2004, at 40, 42.
54
fl.R. 1201 § S(b)(t) (2005).
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circumvent a technological measure in order to infringe a copyright. 55
The amendment also includes other provisions favorable to the
consumer, namely codifying the So'!J' Supreme Court decision that
hardware or software products capable of noninfringing uses do not
\iolate the copyright law,56 allowing exceptions to Section 1201 f0r
purposes of scientificresearch,S7 and requiring companies who sell copyprotected CDs to label those CDs as such.58 Putting the Sot!)' decision
into law would be particularly beneficial as it would allow companies
to create products that circumvent DRM restrictions for legitimate
consumers,59 who generally lack the technical knowledge to do so.
Supporters of the D111CRA include lhe American
Association of Law JJbraries, the American Library Association,
the Association of American Universities, and various technology
and consumer advocacy groups.60 These groups recognize the
importance of granting digital media consumers the rights that
have been guaranteed for many years by the fair use doctrine.

VU.

CoNCLUSION

The DJ\1CRA resrores to consumers the fair use rights that
copyright law has granted them for many years. lt is somewhat
disheartening to purchase a legal copy of a work, only to find oneself
unable to use it according to fair use rights, especially when so much
unprotected content is readily available via the Internet and other
sources. \Vhen consumers are able to use digital media according to
55
Congressman Rich Boucher- Boucher's Statement before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the lnternet, http:/ /www:boucher.
house.g0\·/index.php?option=com_content&task= ,•iew&id= 24&Itemid= (last
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fair use, they have an attractive alternative to illegal downloading and
other infringing activities. This benefits both copyright holders, by
encouraging consumers to purchase their content, and consumers,
by permitting them to use their digital media with more freedom.
If Congress were to pass the DMCRA, companies would
once again be allowed to observe and improve upon competitors'
products without the threat of legal action, in turn benefiting the
marketplace through heightened innovation and competition. Indeed,
such innovation and competition led to the VCR, the MP3 player, and
many other digital technologies. Though copyright holders have often
fought these new devices in the courts, these devices have proven
to benefit both copyright holders and consumers by broadening the
options for producing and consuming creative works. The filmmalcing
industry, for example, has benefited greatly from the sale and rental
of videos, something it did not foresee at the advent of the VCR.
The proper way copyright holders should cope with the capabilities
of digital media is to find new business models which can capitalize
on those capabilities, not hinder those capabilities through legislation.
The DMCRA would also rake copyright legislation out
of the hands of copyright holders and place it back in the courts
and lawmaking bodies where it belongs. These measures would
provide a better context for la\.vmakers to use as the}' draft new
legislation to complement existing copyright laws in the digital age.
For these reasons, Congress should remedy the DMCA's
unintended consequences by passing the D MCRA. The DMCRA
will enable fair use rights to continue to evolve and will create an
opportunity to develop solutions that fairly manage the rights of all.

